Terrill, Robert E. "Protest, Prophesy, and Prudence in the Rhetoric of Malcolm X." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 4.1 (2001): 25-53.

PROTEST, PROPHECY, AND PRUDENCE IN THE RHETORIC OF MALCOLM X

ROBERT E. TERRILL

Prophetic speeches such as "Black Man's History," which Malcolm X delivered while a Nation of Islam minister, encourage a politically passive isolation. "The Ballot or the Bullet," however, delivered after Malcolm left the Nation of Islam, illustrates the rhetorical invention of an oppositional prudence that encourages his audience to deliberate and act in ways that defy the expectations of the dominant culture.

During the 1960s, profound shifts occurred in black protest. Pleas for racial equality in a colorblind society began to be supplanted by a demand for what Celeste Condit and John Lucaites describe as "cultural equality," a mutual respect based upon equal power and resources. Many African American leaders began to abandon the dream of a nation that would judge people not "by the color of their skin but by the content of their character" and to insist, instead, that the exceptional character of the African American experience should be recognized as a source of pride, strength, and "black power." The locus of African American critique shifted from targeting a few isolated bigots standing in the way of inevitable progress to characterizing the entire dominant culture as institutionally racist. Southern desegregation campaigns demonstrated vividly to some, especially in the North, the limitations of an institutional solution, and the vision of a neutral playing field became predicated upon the need for "special government protection." These changes in the objectives of black protest provoked a change in its rhetoric—the prophetic voice, dominant for centuries, was dethroned.

David Howard-Pitney notes that "messianic themes of coming social liberation and redemption have deep roots in black culture," and Elizabeth Vander Lei and Keith D. Miller suggest that the prophetic voice "appealed to African American preachers and abolitionist orators because African American slaves often compared themselves to the Israelite slaves of the Old Testament, awaiting their exodus to the Promised Land of a socially equitable America." The special place of African

Robert E. Terrill is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication & Culture at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana. This essay was developed from his dissertation, completed at Northwestern University under the direction of Michael Leff.

© Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1, 2001, pp. 25-53 ISSN 1094-8392 Americans, as both a part of and apart from the dominant culture, may make particularly attractive a discourse that acknowledges the unrealized potential of that culture and promises its eventual earthly consummation. Further, the relationship of African Americans to the dominant culture parallels the position of the prophet, traditionally one who is "simultaneously insider and outsider," a voice in the wilderness — but who was at the same time a part of the community."

The voice of prophecy is most vibrant when common ideals are shared among its audience, for "it is only in the presence of a viable community that the declaratory impulse in prophecy has adequate credibility to insist on engagement." But during the late I 960s, as the critical attention of African American rhetors turned increasingly toward those very foundations, the prophetic voice lost much of its rhetorical potential. When black protesters began to attack the foundation of the dominant culture and thereby declare themselves no longer a part of that community, prophecy became problematic. To the extent that the fragmentation of the civil rights movement mirrors a more general postmodern cultural fragmentation, the problem magnifies. As James Darsey demonstrates, the voice of prophecy is no longer particularly viable in American public address. One voice that has supplanted prophecy — in protest discourse and elsewhere — is the voice of prudence.

The rhetoric of Malcolm X provides a particularly rich opportunity to explore this shift in African American protest. As Condit and Lucaites point out, Malcolm was personally responsible for invigorating much of this shift. ¹⁰ But perhaps more important is Malcolm's well-documented propensity for fitting his speech to and against exigency and audience. ¹¹ The sometimes dramatic differences in his rhetoric, depending on whether he was addressing a predominantly white or a predominantly black crowd, whether he was inside a Nation of Islam mosque or outside, and indeed whether he was Black Muslim or not, allow his speeches to provide a vivid account of one rhetor's perception of the possibilities for protest. Specifically, after his split from the Nation of Islam (NOI), Malcolm abdicated the prophetic relationship of a Black Muslim minister to his audience because such a stance was ill-suited to his understanding of his and his audience's situation. His audience members had to become active critics of the dominant culture, able to make independent judgments regarding their relationship to it. Prophecy does not constitute such audiences, but prudence does. ¹²

In this essay, I compare the rhetorical potential and limitations of prophecy and prudence as modes of protest discourse, using speeches by Malcolm X as touchstones. The voice of prophecy has dominated African American protest for centuries, and I provide a brief historical review of this rhetorical tradition to define Malcolm's place within it while he was an NOI minister. Then, I concentrate on one speech as representative of Malcolm's NOI rhetoric, suggesting that the peculiar capacities and constraints of this discourse follow from its blending of two strands evident in the history of African American prophetic protest. Prudential protest

does not possess so vivid a tradition, so I develop a comparison between prophecy and prudence conceptually rather than historically. But because "prudence is always operational only in respect to specific circumstances," it then becomes all the more imperative that I illustrate the rhetorical potential and limitations of prudential protest by critically engaging an exemplary text. Malcolm X's well-known speech, "The Ballot or the Bullet," provides a case study of an orator inventing a discourse of oppositional prudence that has the potential to emancipate his audience from limitations imposed upon it by the dominant culture.

PROPHECY

Two types of prophetic discourse characterize African American protest rhetoric — the jeremiad and apocalyptic rhetoric. ¹⁴ The jeremiad, Ronald H. Carpenter explains, "accomplishes its goals rhetorically by a process leading readers to view themselves as a chosen people confronted with a timely if not urgent warning that unless a certain course of atoning action is followed, dire consequences will ensue." ¹⁵ This warning often is coupled to an optimistic preview of coming glory, giving the jeremiad three characteristic elements: "a consideration of the freedom promises in America's founding documents, a detailed criticism of America's failure to fulfill this promise, and a prophecy that America will achieve its promised greatness and enjoy unparalleled happiness." ¹⁶ These elements make clear the jeremiad's utility to rhetors who desire to be included in the dominant culture. Such rhetors agree that, despite current outrages, America is fundamentally good, and that a return to the values from which our culture has temporarily strayed will necessitate emancipation, equality, and general fair-dealing. Indeed, Howard-Pitney suggests that the jeremiad signals a rhetor's "virtually complete acceptance of and incorporation into the national cultural norm of millennial faith in America's promise." ¹⁷ Well-known examples of African American jeremiads include orations such as Frederick Douglass's "What to the Slave is the Fourth of July," and Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I Have a Dream."

There is a second type of African American jeremiad, however, because some rhetors have "embraced exclusive black nationalist myths ... which posit a messianic destiny for blacks apart from, or even in opposition to, the national mission imagined by Anglo-Americans." The audience for this rhetoric generally is the black minority rather than the white majority, because the emphasis is upon the need for African Americans to concentrate on changing their own values and behaviors to align them with a history and culture that is disentangled from white hegemony. In this vision, it is African Americans who fall short of the promise of their past and, if these values are not revivified, the dire consequences that follow will be visited upon blacks, not whites. Because racial oppression has rendered their own history and culture unavailable-and, often, unsavory-to African Americans, such oppositional jeremiads cannot merely recall the covenant. They must reveal a

new vision to their hearers, position this vision as a more authentic source of values and practices than that which informs the dominant culture, and only then call their people home.

A prototypical oppositional jeremiad is W. E. B. Du Bois's 1897 address, "The Conservation of Races," in which he argues that people of African descent cannot fulfill their exceptional destiny unless they preserve and celebrate a distinction between white culture and their own. ²⁰ Marcus Garvey was more radically separatist than W. E. B. Du Bois, at least in the 1920s, but as B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel have argued, a significant aspect of Garvey's rhetorical skill was his ability to inhabit the transcendent persona of a "Black Moses" who offered his followers a "legitimate, honorable self-identity" by urging that "blacks should feel pride as a consequent of their racial membership." ²¹

Apocalyptic rhetoric may or may not entail a call for the reinvigoration of a lost authentic culture, but it often is separatist.²² Because apocalyptic speech promises the inevitable and cataclysmic end of the oppressor, there is little motivation for a rhetoric of integration. Because the end of history means the beginning of the age of righteousness and justice, the great change is welcomed, not feared. And because human thought and action are powerless to alter the approaching apocalypse, this is a rhetoric not of reform but of preparation.²³ While "apocalyptic assures the ultimate triumph of God's will ... justice will require not an enforcement of the terms of the covenant, to which evil is not subject, but a destruction of evil itself."²⁴ While jeremiadic prophecy is a warning to a wayward people, apocalyptic discourse "is always a response to meaninglessness, failure of points of reference, and bewilderment about how to understand the present."²⁵ In other words, the difficulty here is not that the audience has lost sight of latent but persistent values, nor that the audience needs to recover values hitherto unavailable or ridiculed, but rather that all known values themselves are drawn into question. In a universe robbed of its governing categories, apocalyptic discourse offers a dramatic narrative that restructures the present into a conflict between good and evil.²⁶

The rhetoric of apocalypse possesses great suasory potential. For a marginalized people, confronted with daily outrages that seem both arbitrary and obstinate, apocalyptic speech offers explanation-the current evil cannot be destroyed by human effort because it has been divinely ordained. For a people whose identity is in crisis, apocalyptic speech offers not only a world characterized by stability and definition but also a vicarious participation in the unfolding of cosmic destiny. Early examples include Nat Turner's *Confessions*, Robert Alexander's *Ethiopian Manifesto*, and David Walker's *Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World*.²⁷ Characteristic of such texts is an ambivalent role for human agency, for while the fate of the world is not in human hands, this rhetoric does generally advocate some form of human action.²⁸ Walker, for example, does warn his readers to "lay humble at the feet of our Lord and Master Jesus Christ" and to "never make an attempt to gain our freedom or *natural right*

from under our cruel oppressors and murderers, until you see your way clear." But, he also assures his readers that "it is not to be understood, here, that I mean for us to wait until God shall take us by the hair of our heads and drag us out of abject wretchedness and slavery."²⁹

The Nation of Islam rose out of the remnants of Garveyism and other messianic cults in inner-city Detroit. Part of its early success must be attributed to the extraordinary range of its foundational prophecy, which integrates influences of Christianity, orthodox Islam, science fiction, black nationalism, Pan-Africanism, and Freemasonry.³⁰ The rhetoric of ministers of the Nation of Islam during the time of its ascendancy in the early 1960s was tightly controlled by Elijah Muhammad and, for the most part, consisted of delivering variations upon a foundational mythic narrative. In its fully realized form, "Yacub's History," as this myth was known, is a rather uneasy marriage of oppositional jeremiad and apocalypticism. The audience is denounced for its failure to live according to the more authentic values and ideals of the African motherland, and urged to avoid dire consequences by rejecting the corrupt ideology of the white dominant culture. The audience is then told that the end of the white race has been pre-ordained and that nothing can be done to hasten or halt its demise. Specifically, the white reign will end when a half-mile-wide "Mother Plane," currently orbiting the earth, releases 1,500 "Baby Planes" piloted by black men who have never smiled and who each will drop upon the white cultures of America and England three bombs, each capable of producing on impact a mountain one mile high. "Black Man's History," which Malcolm delivered at the Nation of Islam's Temple #7, in Harlem, does not retell the myth of the mother plane but instead focuses on the first part of the story, in which the white race is invented by an evil black scientist named Yacub. Because this speech is an amalgam of two strands of prophetic protest, it displays an inherent tension. It retains the form of the jeremiad, calling its audience to act in accordance with forgotten ideals, but at the same time it retains the rather severe limits on human agency characteristic of apocalyptic rhetoric.

BLACK MAN'S HISTORY

Malcolm delivered "Black Man's History" in December, 1962, at the Nation of Islam's Mosque #7, in Harlem. Speeches like this one were recruitment tools. As C. Eric Lincoln points out, "Muslim teaching ... has a strong attraction for some blacks" because "to be identified with a movement that openly rejects the fundamental values of the powerful majority is to increase vastly one's self-esteem and one's stature among one's peers." But the repetition of "Yacub's History" at Muslim gatherings also was one of the many resources available to Black Muslim ministers to strengthen the commitment of their congregation. As Peter Goldman puts it, the Nation of Islam "offers its true believers a closed system of faith and

behavior; it exacts in return a total commitment to that system — a body-and-soul submission to the will of God and His Last Apo stle."³² Black separatist organizations had flourished during the 19th century primarily among an audience that was southern, rural, poor, and poorly educated; the so-called Great Migration concentrated this audience into the northern black ghettos, and this provided for Elijah Muhammad's Nation of Islam, as it had for Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), a ready audience.³³ Only African Americans were allowed inside NOI Mosques, and these groups were recruited by the current membership from among those most alienated and impoverished.³⁴

As Malcolm X begins "Black Man's History," its jeremiadic lineage is explicit. He first argues that African Americans must learn their history because "the thing that has made the so-called Negro in America fail, more than any other thing, is your, my, lack of knowledge concerning history." This history cannot be separated from matters of race and religion; just as "the white man has never separated Christianity from white," so the Nation of Islam does not separate Islam from black. Therefore, because it combines history and religion into a seamless ideological whole, "Yacub's History" provides precisely the sort of knowledge that will help the audience avoid the dire consequences that follow from cultural ignorance. As Malcolm X puts it, it will "undo the type of brainwashing that we have had to undergo for four hundred years at the hands of the white man."

Malcolm notes that "the Honorable Elijah Muhammad's mission is to teach the so-called Negroes a knowledge of history, the history of ourselves, our own kind, showing us how we fit into prophecy, Biblical prophecy." The role of the prophet, as Darsey points out, is to cure the "defective vision of the people," debunking and stripping away insidious mythology that renders the people blind to the truth.³⁷ Barry Brummett suggests that apocalyptic rhetoric, as a result, is especially "explicit," characterized by what Darsey refers to as a "rhetoric of self-evidence" rising out of a conviction that "if people could simply be made to feel the truth, reform would follow as a necessary consequence."³⁸ In "Black Man's History," prophecy is delivered in a peculiarly literal and concrete manner; the truth of the Bible must be recovered from the mythic overlays of (white) Christianity, and much of the speech is dedicated to cleansing biblical texts so that their historical veracity can be displayed.³⁹ The fifteenth chapter of Genesis, for example, foretelling the bondage and eventual redemption of the seed of Abraham, is not a metaphor for the plight of African Americans, but an actual historical reference to Islamic people of African descent. Exodus is not merely a potentially empowering analogy, but a direct reference to a moment in "Yacub's History"; indeed, the Jews "weren't the people that Moses led out of Egypt, and the Jews know this."⁴⁰ And in Deuteronomy, Elijah Muhammad is revealed to be the prophet promised to the descendants of the Islamic blacks. 41 The purpose of this speech is to reveal Christian mythology as a malicious falsehood that obscures a potentially emancipatory truth.

This characteristic prophetic emphasis on revelation, rather than argument, is further enacted through Malcolm's insistent references to sight.⁴² He commands his audience to "look at it" when he offers a reading of John 8:32-33 to support Elijah Muhammad's claim that Islam was the religion of Abraham. Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm promises, "will open the people's eyes up so wide that from then on a preacher won't be able to talk to them — and this is really true." "It's all right," Malcolm goes on, "to believe when you were a little baby that God made a little doll out of the sand and mud and breathed on it and that was the first man. But here it is 1962 with all this information floating around in everybody's ears — you can get it free. ... Today it's time to listen to nothing but naked, undiluted truth."⁴³

And among the truths that the Bible, as well as white science, withholds from African Americans is the origin of the races. The revelation of this truth is the chief concern of "Black Man's History," for it presents the teachings of a history that Malcolm's Harlem audience must reanimate. In Malcolm's retelling of the tale, which follows closely Elijah Muhammad's own telling, 44 black is ascendant over white at every turn. Blacks have been on the planet longer than whites and, therefore, blacks have knowledge of whites analogous to the knowledge of a father for a son. "Black men have always been the wisest beings in the universe," Malcolm continues, "and among these beings, black beings, there is one who is supreme; he is referred to as the Supreme Being." Whites are evil because they were created by an evil scientist, Yacub, who invented a process of "grafting the brown one from the black one so that it became lighter and lighter." A renegade scientist once attempted to destroy black civilization by blowing it up (he succeeded only in forming the moon), "but you can't destroy the black man; the black man can't destroy himself." Whites hate blacks because this hatred had to be bred into them to accomplish Yacub's plan-"at the outset the nurses had to kill the little black babies, but after a while it got so that the mother, having been brainwashed, hated that black one so much she killed it herself.... So that at the end of the six hundred years by the time they got the white man, they had someone who by nature hated everything that was darker than he was."45 Whites are evil, then, by divine ordination-whites are inexorably corrupt, ontologically weak, and historically irrelevant; blacks are potentially pure, inherently strong, and historically indispensable. A narrative more starkly divided between good and evil would be difficult to imagine.

Because the doctrine of the Black Muslims combined the call to action of the jeremiad with the potential passivity encouraged by apocalyptic rhetoric, it fostered intense activity within fairly narrow bounds. On the one hand, members of the Nation of Islam were required to alter their lives significantly; diet, friendship, dress, reading habits, spending patterns, courtship and marriage, and leisure activities were all dictated by the rules of the Nation. Indeed, NOI membership required almost constant motion. Building Muslim-owned businesses, attending meetings and lectures almost every night of the week, praying five times a day, and selling a

prescribed number of copies of Muhammad Speaks made many members more active and visible in their communities than they were before joining. On the other hand, human action is limited because ultimate redemption is completely up to Allah; one day, without warning, He will release the spaceships of Armageddon and white dominance will be a smoldering memory. While "Yacub's History" both presents a set of foundational values and calls a wayward flock back to them, it does not invite its audience to engage in social action.

In other words, this prophetic speech does not model for its audiences a productive relationship between invention and action; its hearers may be encouraged to act in accordance with values and standards that have become obscured, but not to judge critically or make independent decisions. Darsey notes that prophetic discourse "shatters the unity of rhetoric. *Inventio* and *actio* are not products of the same agent." Because "prophetic speech is incomprehensible except as the speech of a divine messenger," the prophet and the word are divided.⁴⁸ This is perhaps especially true for Malcolm X, for Elijah Muhammad was the Messenger who spoke in the name of Allah, whom he had met in Detroit in the person of the mysterious Mr. Fard. 49 Malcolm X was the prophet's mouthpiece and interpreter, whose job it was to extract, "from Muhammad's diffuse and often confusing rhetoric, themes he deemed salient to contemporary urban Blacks."⁵⁰ Doubly insulated from the invention of his own speech, Malcolm X's rhetoric could not demonstrate, or inculcate in his audience, a productive relationship between invention and action. "Given a truth that is absolute," Darsey points out, "it makes no sense to talk of 'practical wisdom,' 'sensitivity to the occasion,' 'opportunistic economizing,' 'the capacity to learn from experience,' 'flexibility and looseness of interest,' or 'bargaining.'" There need be no particular connection between invention and action because the audience is proscribed from inventional activities; always, all decisions already have been made. In prophetic discourse in general, and perhaps in Malcolm's discourse in particular, the goal is not an audience that is prudent because it can discern, but rather it is an audience that is righteous because it knows.

PRUDENCE

A prophetic discourse is well-suited to an audience who shares among its members and with the prophet a relatively stable set of foundational truths; "the prophet shares the ideals of his audience," and it is for this reason that the prophet is able to identify with the audience even though she or he does not share "the realities of its everyday life." Malcolm's discourse while an NOI minister is particularly productive in this regard because it supplies the very truths toward which it calls its audience. Attempts to identify with the dominant culture are pathological-those truths are "designed to make us look down on black and up at white" and accepting the new truths provided by Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam afford the

opportunity for an extraordinarily strong sense of identification between speaker and audience. Kenneth Burke reminds us that identification often implies division,⁵³ and NOI rhetoric is particularly separatist. In June of 1963, for example, speaking at Adam Clayton Powell's Abyssinian Baptist Church, Malcolm warned of the need to separate from the doomed white race, for "this American House of Bondage is number one on God's list for divine destruction today." Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm continues, "warns us to remember Noah never taught integration, Noah taught separation; Moses never taught integration, Moses taught separation." "We are not an organization," Elijah Muhammad once noted, "we are a world." "St

On March 12, 1964, Malcolm X announced that he was leaving that world. The circumstances of his exit from the Nation of Islam are complex, involving a growing distrust and jealousy among some of the Nation's leaders regarding Malcolm's increasingly public persona, revelations concerning Elijah Muhammad's adulterous relationships with several of his secretaries, and Malcolm's chafing under the Nation's strict proscriptions against social action.⁵⁶ In leaving the Nation, Malcolm renounced access to "Yacub's History." Also, outside the mosque he faced a more complex audience-more likely to be multiracial, less likely to be potential members of the Nation of Islam. Nor were his new audiences made up of a large number of former NOI members, for Elijah Muhammad and a young Louis Farrakhan issued a number of public warnings to those who might be tempted to follow Malcolm X out of the Nation.⁵⁷

Malcolm's split with the Nation of Islam also overlapped an increasing fragmentation in the mainstream civil rights movement that was symptomatic of growing dissatisfaction among many African Americans with the effort to present a unified racial front. John Lewis had been disciplined at the March on Washington the previous August, but the differences between the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the movement elders remained unresolved. In November 1963 an attempt to establish a northern outpost of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in Detroit broke up, and Malcolm X delivered his famous "Message to the Grass Roots" to a group of black leaders interested in becoming less nonviolent. Plans were being made for Mississippi Freedom Summer, which would precipitate much of the general disintegration of the civil rights movement as the paradigm shifted from "integration" to "black power. Malcolm X emerged from the Nation of Islam, then, to face an increasingly fragmented audience — unsuitable for a rhetoric of prophecy, even if Malcolm X had possessed some set of truths that he could have presented.

Malcolm X's discourse after he left the Nation of Islam was not prophetic, but prudent. Prudence "is required precisely when one is no longer safely within a realm wholly determined by one art, one subject, one group, one objective," 61 which describes closely the rhetorical situation of the post-NOi Malcolm X. Robert

Hariman defines prudence as "the mode of reasoning about contingent matters in order to select the best course of action," and Malcolm X models this reasoning for his audience. But, more specifically, Malcolm X produces a rhetoric of oppositional prudence, demonstrating for his audience members a prudential reasoning that invites them outside the confines of the dominant culture.

While prophecy emphasizes action in accordance with a revealed and universalized array of possibilities, prudence emphasizes the inventional and individualized perception of the possibilities inherent in any given situation. While both prophetic and prudent rhetoric can be responses to crises of identity, prophecy seeks to restore a viable identity through urging a recommitment to stable and fundamental precepts. ⁶³ Prophecy is inner-directed, in that it instructs its audience to pay attention to itself, its actions, and its relationship to a collective past. Prudence, in contrast, because of its emphasis on sensitivity to the rhetorical situation, directs its audience to attend in particular ways to its relationships with the other. Both prophecy and prudence encourage action, but prophecy — and especially the combination of oppositional jeremiad and apocalypticism that characterize Black Muslim rhetoric — urges that the actions of the audience return to confines marked by enduring truths, renouncing the corruption of political entanglements. Prudence, on the other hand, prepares the audience to function in a world in which "truth" is contingent, unstable, and mired in temporal circumstance.

Prudence is not mere deliberation, though "good deliberation is pre-eminently the work of the practically wise man." Nor is prudence equivalent to action, though it is "concerned with doing," and particular actions might be prudent. Rather, prudence is characterized by an emphasis on the ability to maintain a dynamic balance-between individual advance and universal good, particular cases and global rules, action and thought, praxis and theory. This emphasis on balance provides the historical and theoretical link between prudence and decorum, that flexible principle "that unifies the elements of a discourse even as it adjusts them to the fluid ethical and political contexts in which it appears." Decorum is a way of naming the properties of "fittingness" that help the parts of a rhetorical text cohere, and also names the ways that the text has been crafted to "fit" a particular audience and situation. Decorum is a notoriously slippery subject because it might refer to any number of textual properties, but it is useful as a way to discuss some aspects of a rhetorical text's potential power. If a text seems particularly "fitting," it may also seem particularly persuasive.

A traditionally prudential discourse is ruled by decorum, for such discourse is the product of an inventional deliberation that demonstrates and enacts an appropriate and efficacious relationship between words and things. It is through this interaction of form and function that a decorous text "teaches prudence by presenting its own argument as an example of prudent action." The prudential deliberation that characterizes decorous textual invention is enacted in the text and

vivified at its moment of performance. The concept of prudence, in other words, offers access to a point of intersection between rhetoric and the world. These texts present their audience with a modeled enactment of prudence; they invite their audiences, in effect, to deliberate and act in life in the same way that the rhetor has deliberated and acted in the rhetorical invention of the text. Just as prudential wisdom constitutes decorous texts, an audience constituted through such a text is instructed in prudential habits of mind. When linked in this way, prudence and decorum regulate the limits of the possible. Under such conditions, "prudence becomes the master code for successful performance within a community, and the use of prudence as a norm becomes a means for maintaining the community's traditional alignment of its social practices." To this extent, the normative potential of prophecy and prudence overlap significantly.

However, it is possible to reconfigure prudence as a discourse of opposition. "The Ballot or the Bullet," Malcolm X's most important speech between his split with the Nation of Islam and his famous journey to Mecca, ⁶⁸ provides a model of indecorous performance in an effort to shatter the conservative connection between prudence and decorum. In this speech, Malcolm offers models of indecorousness, radically collapsing and juxtaposing terms and populating the speech with individuals acting in ways that flout the rules of the dominant culture. A prudence unbound from the expectations of decorum would no longer be normative, but instead would school its audience in a habit of critical judgment freed from decorous expectations. In a world governed by pervasive conspiracy and arbitrary negation, it is imperative to act in ways that defy limitations. This is a rhetoric of widening circumference, stretching the audience's conception of the possible even toward the dangerous or absurd, because prudence requires room in which to maneuver. The emancipatory potential of Malcolm's post-NOI rhetoric lies in this division of prudence and decorum, for an audience fashioned in and through such a performance would be prepared for, and encouraged to engage in, reasoned critique from a perspective outside the confines of the dominant culture.

THE BALLOT OR THE BULLET

Malcolm X delivered "The Ballot or the Bullet" to a predominantly black audience at the Cory Methodist Church on April 3, 1964, at a meeting sponsored by the Cleveland Chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (C ORE).⁶⁹ The first two-thirds of the speech pushes against decorous boundaries that limit African American behavior and self-evaluation. In a pattern common in his post-NOI public address, Malcolm works first within a domestic scene, and then expands to an international scene, drawing parallels between the two.⁷⁰ In doing so, Malcolm broadens his audience's range of inventional possibilities but does not advocate direct action in either of these scenes. Instead, he offers an inventional repertoire

that strains against the limitations imposed upon his audience. In the final third of the speech, working within this broadened framework, Malcolm models the oppositional prudence that he would foster in his audience.

Voting or Violence

After welcoming his audience, both his "friends and enemies," Malcolm compares himself to Adam Clayton Powell, Martin Luther King, and Milton Galamison. For example, "just as Adam Clayton Powell is a Christian minister who heads the Abyssinian Baptist Church in New York, but at the same time takes part in the political struggles to try to bring about rights to the black people in this country," Malcolm is "a Muslim minister" who believes "in action on all fronts by whatever means necessary." But the individuals that Malcolm has named inhabit prophetic personas, and their activism was encompassed by the stable truths constituting their religious doctrine, while Malcolm no longer had access to such truths. In fact, Malcolm rarely mentioned Islam in any of his post-NOI speeches, and here declares that "although I'm still a Muslim, I'm not here tonight to discuss my religion." James Cone thinks that Malcolm eschews NOI doctrine "in the interest of black unity," but Malcolm seems suspicious of the referential identity that might foster unity: 'Tm not a Democrat, I'm not a Republican, and I don't even consider myself an American," because "being born here in America doesn't make you an American." Malcolm offers no alternative to the identity he has just stripped away; this is the speech of a man from nowhere, and much of the speech is an effort to effect a similar dissociation in his audience. Prudence emphasizes individualized judgment rather than group cohesion.

Like "Black Man's History," this speech emphasizes sight; here, however, Malcolm is not offering objects to his audience to be observed as factual revelation, but instead is attempting to foster critical perspective. 'Tm speaking as a victim of this American system," he declares. "And I see America through the eyes of the victim. I don't see any American dream; I see an American nightmare." African Americans, he declares, "are waking up. Their eyes are coming open," but they are not looking at the world passively as in "Black Man's History." The emphasis here is on active response: "they're beginning to see what they used to only look at. They're becoming politically mature." There may be "a few big Negroes" getting jobs, Malcolm points out, but "those big Negroes didn't need big jobs, they already had jobs"; his audience must be able to see that it is "camouflage, that's trickery, that's treachery, window-dressing." "It's time," Malcolm continues, "for you and me to wake up and start looking at it like it is, and trying to understand it like it is; and then we can deal with it like it is." A political maturity that relies on inventional perspicuity is precisely a form of prudential wisdom.

The speech depends for much of its development on exploring the "ballot" and the "bullet" in different contexts, and the first referent for the "ballot" is domestic U.S. voting rights. Malcolm indicates the potential power of the African American vote, explaining that "when white people are evenly divided, and black people have a bloc of votes of their own, it is left up to them to determine who's going to sit in the White House and who's going to be in the dog house." His audience might expect at this point an injunction to "Vote!," or an argument for increased access to the ballot. But using the vote in a politically mature manner is not possible within the artificially narrow experiential life allowed to Malcolm's audience. So, Malcolm immediately shuts the door he just seemed to open, declaring that "your vote, your dumb vote, your ignorant vote, your wasted vote put in an administration in Washington, D.C., that has seen fit to pass every kind of legislation imaginable, saving you until last, and then filibustering on top of that." The purpose here is to sharpen perception, and not yet to urge action.

"They have got a con game going on, a political con game, and you and I are in the middle," Malcolm tells his audience. "So it's time in 1964 to wake up, and when you see them coming up with that kind of conspiracy, let them know your eyes are open. And let them know you got something else that's wide open too. It's got to be the ballot or the bullet." Turning his attention to that bullet, Malcolm warns that "now you're facing a situation where the young Negro's coming up" and "they don't want to hear that 'turn-the-other-cheek' stuff, no." He cites approvingly a recent newspaper story about teenagers in Jacksonville "throwing Molotov cocktails" as evidence that "there's new thinking coming in. ... It'll be Molotov cocktails this month, hand grenades next month, and something else next month. It'll be ballots, or it'll be bullets. It'll be liberty, or it will be death. The only difference about this kind of death," Malcolm continues, deftly subverting this famous bit of American folklore, "it'll be reciprocal."⁷⁷

This sort of action is justified because African Americans are merely "trying to collect for our investment. Three hundred and ten years we worked in this country without a dime in return — I mean without a dime in return." At once both relying upon and subverting the logic of capitalism, Malcolm argues that civil rights are already the rightful property of African Americans, bought and paid for by years of uncompensated labor, and therefore almost any method is appropriate: "whenever you're going after something that belongs to you, anyone who's depriving you of the right to have it is a criminal." When African Americans protest against the white establishment, "the law is on your side. The Supreme Court is on your side." Because "the police department itself" is guilty of depriving African Americans of their rights, the officers therefore "are not representatives of the law." But again, instead of an unambiguous call to action Malcolm tells his audience that if "a man has the audacity to put a police dog on you, kill that dog, kill him, I'm telling you, kill that dog. I say it, if they put me in jail tomorrow, kill – that – dog."

Malcolm further limits the threat of violence while at the same time illustrating a process of indecorous logic. "I don't mean go out and get violent," he says, "but at the same time you should never be nonviolent unless you run into some nonviolence"; "I'm nonviolent with those who are nonviolent with me. But when you drop that violence on me, then you've made me go insane, and I'm not responsible for what I do. And that's the way every Negro should get."⁷⁹ Malcolm never explicitly advocated violence, but at the same time, this rhetoric does seem to encourage violent action. Malcolm's speech at once both opens up violence as a possibility for his audience and warns his audience not to engage in violence. The resulting tension fosters an incipient willingness to consider acting in ways that ignore the expectations of the dominant culture, but issues no command to take such action. This liminality is essential to oppositional prudence, because such habits of thought must be free of the constraints of acceptable behavior. Malcolm has urged his audience not to use the "ballot" until they "wake up," and now similarly urges his listeners to make judgments concerning their use of the "bullet" based on a sphere of reference that transgresses against the boundaries of the dominant culture. Urging the congregation gathered in the Cory Methodist Church to throw Molotov cocktails or kill police dogs would be imprudent; but, an oppositional prudence such as Malcolm is developing requires that the inventional range of the audience be broadened so that such actions can be included as fully justified possibilities.

Representation or Warfare

When Malcolm directs his audience to return its attention to the "ballot," it is in an international context. The broader scope is evident as he makes his transition: "When we begin to get in this area, we need new friends, we need new allies. We need to expand the civil-rights struggle to a higher level to the level of human rights." The shift from "civil" to "human" rights enacts a broadening of scope, placing the particular case of U.S. race relations within an unfamiliar context and thus continuing to encourage the development of his audience's analytical range. Importantly, this shift also is a key moment in the severing of prudence from decorum, because it releases his audience from the confines of *civility*. Rights do not follow from citizenship, so there is no obligation to continue to act in accordance with the expectations of any particular national government.

The international "ballot" entails taking "Uncle Sam before a world court" in the United Nations. 82 While this is not an uncivil action, it does represent an attempt to escape the oppressive "civility" of the white American justice system. Malcolm envisions an arena "where our African brothers can throw their weight on our side, where our Latin-American brothers can throw their weight on our side, and where 800 million Chinamen are sitting there waiting to throw their weight on our side." Continuing to define the

struggle as one for civil rights forces African Americans to appeal "to the criminal who's responsible," making his audience "look like a chump before the eyes of the world"⁸³ and isolating them within the norms of a corrupt social knowledge.

The audience might expect at this point an explanation of the steps they could take to convene this international court, but Malcolm does not yet advocate any specific political action; instead, he offers a model of outrageous behavior. Rather than asking his audience to work within an existing system, Malcolm X invites his audience members to identify themselves outside the system and then he tells a story that illustrates white hypocrisy. "You'd get farther calling yourself African instead of Negro," he tells them, because "they don't have to pass civil-rights bills for Africans Just stop being a Negro. Change your name to Hoogagagooba." Malcolm tells that "a friend of mine who's very dark put a turban on his head and went into a restaurant in Atlanta before they called themselves desegregated." He continues:

He went into a white restaurant, he sat down, they served him, and he said, 'What would happen if a Negro came in here?' And there he's sitting, black as night, but because he had his head wrapped up the waitress looked back at him and says, 'Why, there wouldn't no nigger dare come in here.'84

Dressing in this way would not ensure the safety of the members of his audience in a segregated southern restaurant — such an action hardly would be prudent. But, like the "trickster" figure in African American slave stories, Malcolm's turban-wearing friend exposes "the neat hierarchy of the world in which he was forced to live." The story provides a graphically indecorous possibility that fosters oppositional prudence by straining against the definitional barriers erected by the dominant culture while at the same time illustrating the arbitrary fabrication of those barriers.

Malcolm returns his audience's attention to the "bullet" and links it to international guerrilla warfare, justifying the connection and, again, widening the range of possibility. After all, the white man is "frightened" because "everywhere he's fighting, he's fighting someone your and my complexion. And they're beating him." Malcolm provides the encouraging news that the darker races have an advantage over the whites because "they engage him in guerrilla warfare. That's not his style." But again, Malcolm's discussion of the international "bullet" lacks a clear call to or model of social action; his immediate audience and the prospect of global war are juxtaposed, but agency is conspicuously absent:

Just as guerrilla warfare is prevailing in Asia and in parts of Africa and in parts of Latin America, you've got to be mighty naive, or you've got to play the black man cheap, if you don't think some day he's going to wake up and find that it's got to be the ballot or the bullet.⁸⁷

Malcolm notes that when you're a guerrilla, "all you have is a rifle, some sneakers and a bowl of rice," a description not only unlikely to attract converts but also far from the probable experiences of anyone in his audience. Starting a guerrilla war in Cleveland probably would not be prudent, but entertaining the possibility certainly is indecorous. Like the Jacksonville teens throwing Molotov cocktails, the U.N. trial, and the turban-wearing friend, the Bedouin guerrillas that Malcolm describes broaden the palate of identities and actions from which his audience might choose.

Ballots and Bullets

Malcolm has delayed advocating or modeling an unproblematic course of action, but he has stretched the boundaries of the possible and thereby opened up some conceptual space that might allow the analytical flexibility that prudence requires. He marks his conclusion by saying, "in closing, a few things concerning the Muslim Mosque, Inc., which we established recently in New York City." He reiterates that his voice is no longer that of the prophet; "it's true we're Muslims and our religion is Islam," he says, "but we don't mix our religion with our politics and our economics and our social and civil activities-not any more." Rather than being tied to a static and confining revealed truth, whether political or religious, the organization Malcolm describes seems characterized by a radical flexibility-what he later would term "positive neutrality": 89 "We become involved with anybody, anywhere, any time and in any manner that's designed to eliminate the evils, the political, economic and social evils that are afflicting the people of our community." Malcolm's final formulation of the relationship between ballots and bullets suggests that this is an organization in which deliberative choice is paramount: "A ballot is like a bullet. You don't throw your ballots until you see a target, and if that target is not within your reach, keep your ballot in your pocket." 90

But this contingent flexibility is tempered by a relatively stable set of precepts. "The political philosophy of black nationalism," Malcolm explains, "means that the black man should control the politics and the politicians in his own community"; "the economic philosophy of black nationalism is pure and simple. It only means that we should control the economy of our community"; and "the social philosophy of black nationalism only means that we have to get together and remove the evils, the vices, alcoholism, drug addiction, and other evils that are destroying the moral fiber of our community." This is not a flexibility cut loose from a moral compass, for that would set Malcolm and his audience adrift and in danger of cooptation. Rather, this organization is characterized by a flexibility restrained by a purposive focus on particular goals, and these goals place it and its members in contact with but permanently opposed to the dominant culture. At the same time, the black nationalism that Malcolm describes is not a group or movement unto itself but a habit of thought and way of being that, once internalized, governs individual action. To illustrate this

concept he selects the unlikely figure of evangelist Billy Graham, pointing out that if Graham "came in trying to start a church, all the churches would be against him." Instead, Graham "tells everybody who gets Christ to go to any church where Christ is So we're going to take a page from his book."⁹¹

Malcolm's plan for "a black nationalist convention" emphasizes the exploration of possibilities and deliberate choice that typifies prudence, and at the same time expands the range of possibilities beyond the bounds of decorum. He promises that "we will hold a seminar, we will hold discussions, we will listen to everyone," and "at that time, if we see fit then to form a black nationalist party, we'll form a black nationalist party. If it's necessary to form a black nationalist army, we'll form a black nationalist army. It'll be the ballot or the bullet." The two key terms of this speech mark the extremes of a wide range of options-Malcolm promises that "we will work with anybody, anywhere, at any time, who is genuinely interested in tackling the problem head-on, nonviolently as long as the enemy is nonviolent, but violent when the enemy gets violent." Anything is possible, governed on the one hand by the enduring general commitment to racial uplift and on the other by the shifting particulars of contingency.

African Americans must be in control of themselves, their identity, their analysis, and their actions, for only then is it possible to enact the particular form of oppositional prudence that Malcolm X advocates. Malcolm illustrates this point by differentiating a segregated school and a separated school: "a segregated district or community is a community in which people live, but outsiders control the politics and the economy of that community. ... You've got to control your own. Just like the white man has control of his, you need to control yours." This is separation as a symbolic store of political capital, not as an isolationist withdrawal. Malcolm's final illustration again emphasizes both deliberation and flexibility when he revisits some of his earlier statements regarding the formation of rifle clubs. Though "it's time for Negroes to defend themselves," he emphasizes that "this doesn't mean you're going to get a rifle and form battalions and go out looking for white folks"; "this doesn't mean forming rifle clubs and going out looking for people"; and again, "I hope you understand. Don't go out shooting people." But after careful consideration and thorough analysis, his audience would be "within your rights — I mean, you'd be justified" to entertain violence as a prudent but indecorous response to an outrageous situation. 93

CONCLUSION

While a minister in the Nation of Islam, Malcolm crafted from the rambling revelations of Elijah Muhammad a hermetically sealed prophetic rhetoric-it called upon its audience to realign their values and behaviors with a foundational set of truths presented in and through that very discourse. Speaker and message were

twice removed from one another, so that Malcolm's rhetoric could not model the productive connection between thought and action fundamental to prudence. His audience was invited to act, but only to bring itself in accord with NOI doctrine. The audience was presented with stable, enduring truths, but the nature of these truths preempted their realization.

This is not to say that the prophetic speech that defined Elijah Muhammad's Nation of Islam lacked rhetorical power. As interpreted by Malcolm X, this discourse precipitated an amazing period of growth; when Malcolm was released from prison in I 952, the active membership in the two existing temples of the Nation of Islam numbered perhaps a few hundred, but by the time he left the Nation in 1964, there were 35 NOI mosques in major urban centers from coast to coast. For much of its impact, prophetic discourse relies upon its use of familiar forms; in NOI prophecy, white racism is countered by a prideful black essentialism, and Elijah Muhammad's self-help economic separatism refracts the capitalist dominant culture. Also, as Louis DeCaro, Jr., notes, NOI founder W. D. Fard "apparently recognized that no successful liberation movement among African Americans could afford to divorce itself from the Bible as an authoritative canon." Much of early NOI doctrine was formulated through novel interpretations of biblical texts, in effect substituting one mythic cultural underpinning for another. In Burkean terms, NOI doctrine rejected the "piety" of the dominant culture and supplanted it with another piety, retaining the hierarchical assumptions and structures that gave rise to the original.

Thus prophetic protest can be especially prone to what Mark McPhail calls "complicity": "a consequence of oppositional discourse that uncritically accepts the underlying assumptions of foundationist or essentialist classification." Because it merely mirrors the foundational myths of the dominant culture and rests upon the same essentialist assumptions of that culture, such rhetoric necessarily is trapped into a dichotomous and supplemental relationship with that culture. Its potential to offer emancipation is limited because it can offer only a vision defined in and through its relationship to the thing it opposes. Not only does this rhetoric undermine "the possibility of collective emancipatory action across racial lines," but it also "silences voices within a race in a manner that simply replaces one oppressive discourse for another."

The dangers of complicity inherent in this form of what Cornel West calls "racial reasoning" have periodically achieved concrete manifestation in the history of black nationalism. ¹⁰⁰ Marcus Garvey, for example, did not reject the enthusiastic support of such white racists as Major Earnest Sevier Cox, author of White America, and John Powell, organizer of the Anglo-Saxon Clubs of America. In 1922 Garvey traveled to Atlanta to meet with Edward Young Clark, Imperial Giant of the Ku Klux Klan, to seek financial and political support for the Back to Africa program of his UNIA. ¹⁰¹ Though this meeting provoked great condemnation among other African American

leaders at the time, Garvey wrote: "give me the Klan for their honesty of purpose toward the Negro." "They are better friends to my race," he went on, "than all the hypocrites put together with their false gods and religion, notwithstanding." Malcolm X reported shortly before his death that in December 1960 he had been ordered by Elijah Muhammad to go to Atlanta to meet representatives of the KKK to investigate their offer to Muhammad of a tract of land "so that his program of separation would sound more feasible to Negroes and therefore lessen the pressure that the integrationists were putting upon the white man." When Louis Farrakhan gained control of the Nation of Islam, he took as one of his goals reinvigorating the prophetic teachings of Elijah Muhammad. As McPhail points out, Farrakhan's rhetoric is characterized by much the same complicity and "fallacy of race" as the NOI rhetoric of Malcolm X. And in 1996 Farrakhan invited white supremacist Lyndon LaRouche to address a gathering of black nationalists in St. Louis.

A discourse of prudence avoids the pitfalls of complicity. As Jim Kuypers notes, "prudence is not concerned with bodies of knowledge, nor is it contained in bodies of propositions; instead it is concerned with action" — in particular, with action-in-the-world, social action. Because of this emphasis on engaging the contingent, prudential reasoning is suspicious of essentialism. Nothing is true all of the time; the prudent need is to determine what is most true in a particular situation. While a discourse of prophecy relies upon the rigidity that fosters complicity, prudence disallows it. Further, because public address such as "The Ballot or the Bullet" presents an oppositional prudence, the forms of thought it encourages fall beyond the pale of complicitous reasoning.

The reasoning that Malcolm models for his audience is given form and life at the moment of rhetorical performance, "the result of a process of interaction at a given moment." Malcolm is precipitating a form of contingent knowledge that is not "something fixed and final" but instead is "something to be created moment by moment" as he interacts with particular circumstances and audiences. ¹⁰⁸ The auditor who attempts to extract from Malcolm's rhetoric a stable ideological formation will be disappointed, for what Malcolm has to offer is instantiated in his discourse itself. Malcolm's prudence, then, requires him to shoulder the burdens of the "strong case for rhetoric," for in this view rhetoric "emerges not as ornamentation, nor as an instrument for disseminating truths gained through other means, but as the very medium in which social knowledge is generated." ¹⁰⁹ A prudent rhetor cannot allow her or his text either to wander too far toward a poetic excess of amplification, nor to become mired in a lifeless pragmatism. Rather, tendencies toward the two extremes are managed in a perpetual tension, mimicking the tension between universals and particulars entailed by prudence. ¹¹⁰ This performative/interpretive tension enlivens a text which performs, through its form, a prudential wisdom as it is made available to the audience. Rhetorical texts, then, might be "seen less as an object than as reflecting a certain process or activity of judgment."

The perception and deliberation generally associated with prudence prepares a speaker and audience to engage their own culture rhetorically. But Malcolm models for his audience a mode of prudence that operates outside the dominant culture-an oppositional prudence. Malcolm's development of this mode of protest depends upon a willingness to reject decorum; and yet, Malcolm's rhetoric does not reject decorum altogether, because decorum is a twofold concept. Externally, decorum regulates the relationship of the discourse to the world, adjusting it "to the fluid ethical and political contexts in which it appears"; but internally it also "orders the elements of a discourse and rounds them out into a coherent product relative to the occasion."¹¹² Malcolm does free his rhetoric and his audience from expectations imposed by the political context, and to that extent his discourse is indecorous; it must be if it is to carry emancipatory potential. But Malcolm's rhetoric is not rendered incoherent in the process. Indeed, it is through the coherent aesthetic form of his discourse that it generates meaning; as he leads his audience members through his performance, he attenuates the possibility for action until he has broadened their palate of inventional resources. To model prudence, Malcolm's discourse must cohere. In that sense, then, Malcolm's rhetoric is internally decorous because its structure displays and precipitates prudential habits of mind. This split between senses of decorum that are external and internal to the text is essential to the development of an oppositional prudence. In bearing witness to Malcolm's oratory, his audience is schooled in prudential protest.

At the same time, and ironically, Malcolm X's oppositional prudence does exhibit a well-fitted relationship to certain aspects of contemporary American culture. It was produced, in part, as a response to an African American critique of the American ideal and the resultant fragmentation of the civil rights movement, and this fragmentation itself was a reflection of larger-scale atomization. As Wilson Moses puts it:

The erosion of traditional black messianism is parallel, of course, to the disintegration of the myth of destiny that once flourished at the center of American consciousness. The loss of direction experienced by black America since the deaths of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King is symptomatic of the loss of purpose experienced by the entire society since the debacle of Vietnam.¹¹³

Indeed, Martin Luther King Jr. provides a comparative case study of the difficulties in adapting a prophetic voice to a contingent world. As Vander Lei and Miller point out, "the man who delivered 'I Have a Dream' was absolutely an oratorical conservative," delivering to America a relatively gentle jeremiad, reminding us of our collective values and promises and foretelling a gleaming future return to them. ¹¹⁴ The riots, bloodshed, and divisiveness that characterized America during the Vietnam years convinced King that "America verged on self-destruction," and caused him to feel "more strongly than ever a prophetic duty to warn America against its folly."

Contributions to the SCLC were drying up, white America had lost much of its taste for being reminded of how far away it had fallen from its own dreams, and King's ability to forge civil rights coalitions was being sorely tested within the movement. While "King no longer found temporal evidence pointing to America's imminent reformation ... in the realm of prophecy he kept faith in America's promise, and he continued to act in accordance with that faith." His prophetic rhetoric was unable to respond to the systemic cultural shifts of the Vietnam era, however, and never regained the cultural resonance accorded it in 1963; "King ended his life as a disappointed, yet ultimately faithful, jeremiah, still pursuing and prophesying the final fulfillment of America's democratic promise." His rhetoric lives on, of course, now almost thoroughly assimilated.

Malcolm's discourse of oppositional prudence, on the other hand, eschews the nostalgia that permeates prophecy and looks to a future that is to be constituted beyond the limitations of the present. It trains its auditors to become cultural critics, able to view their relationship to a dominant other from a position outside that dominance. It relishes fragmentation and contingency, for these nourish its desire to maintain multiple points of view. It resists co-optation, for its oppositional stance rejects the fundamental assumptions of the dominant culture. Most importantly, for Malcolm's audience, prudence as interpretive hermeneutic and as political strategy are merged. 116 The ability to read the dominant culture as text and to negotiate a politically viable identity between that text and one's own experience becomes not only constituent to, but indistinguishable from, the ability to perform viable political action. Malcolm has much to teach students of rhetoric, then, because in his discourse terms that are held sometimes in lifeless isolation-rhetoric, criticism, political action-are vivified as they become inextricably entwined. Malcolm has much to teach those who would negotiate the contemporary political terrain, to the extent that postmodernity presents us all with the conundrums that faced him and his audience. And because prudence as a habit of mind is best learned through the study of artful public address, rhetorical critics may have a special obligation to make texts such as Malcolm's available as what Burke calls "equipment for living." 117

NOTES

- 1. Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites, *Crafting Equality: America's Anglo-African Word* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), 191-97. Akinyele O. Umoja provides a detailed account of the shifts in emphasis and leadership styles in SNCC and CORE; see his "The Ballot and the Bullet," *Journal of Black Studies* 29 (1999): 558-79. On the shift from civil rights to black power, see also Sean Dennis Cashman, *African-Americans and the Quest for Civil Rights, 1900-1990* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 184-215.
- 2. Martin Luther King Jr., "I Have a Dream," in *Three Centuries of American Rhetorical Discourse: An Anthology and Review*, ed. Ronald F. Reid (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland, 1988), 725.
- 3. Condit and Lucaites, *Crafting Equality*, 191. Adam Clayton Powell noted in a 1963 manifesto: "Civil Rights Act Meaningless for 2/3 outside of the South"; see Taylor Branch, *Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years*, 1963-1965 (New York: Touchstone, 1998), 95. Notably, it was Powell who coined the phrase "black power," later taken up and popularized by Stokely Carmichael during the James Meredith march that ended in Canton, Mississippi, in June, 1966.

- 4. David Howard-Pitney, *The Afro-American Jeremiad: Appeals for Justice in America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 12.
- 5. Elizabeth Vander Lei and Keith D. Miller, "Martin Luther King Jr.'s 'I Have a Dream' in Context: Ceremonial Protest and African American Jeremiad," *College English* 62 (1999): 88.
- 6. James Darsey, *The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 202.
- 7. Kurt W. Ritter, "American Political Rhetoric and the Jeremiad Tradition: Presidential Nomination Acceptance Addresses, 1960-1976," *Central States Speech Journal* 31 (1980): 187.
- 8. Darsey, Prophetic Tradition, 111.
- 9. For eloquent discussions of the appropriateness of prudence in contemporary politics, see: Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, "Post-Realism: Strategic Intelligence and Discursive Realities," in *Post Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, ed. Francis A Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 387-414; Hariman and Beer, "What Would Be Prudent? Forms of Reasoning in World Politics," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* I (1998): 299-330; Robert Hariman, "The History of Prudence in the Twenty-First Century," and Maurice Charland, "Lyotard's Postmodern Prudence," both in *The Discourses of Prudence*, ed. Robert Hariman (forthcoming). I am deeply indebted to Hariman and Charland for allowing me to see and cite manuscript copies of their essays.
- 10. Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality, 191-92.
- 11. For example, Peter Goldman notes that Malcolm X "spoke a fluent, downtown English when he needed to, but his first language was a slurred and cynical ghetto black." See *The Death and Life of Malcolm X* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979), 306. See also: John Illo, "The Rhetoric of Malcolm X," *Columbia University Forum* 9 (1966): 5-12.
- 12. On the ability for rhetoric to constitute audiences, see: Edwin Black, "The Second Persona," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 56 (1970): 109-19; Maurice Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Quebecois," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73 (1987): 133-50.
- 13. Robert Hariman, "Theory without Modernity," in *Discourses of Prudence* (forthcoming).
- 14. I treat the jeremiad and apocalyptic rhetoric as two sub-genres of prophetic speech, but this relationship is by no means a settled issue. Barry Brummett calls the jeremiad the "generic neighbor" of apocalyptic, which seems consonant with the sort of relationship I am attempting to describe; see his "Premillennial Apocalyptic as a Rhetorical Genre," *Central States Speech Journal* 35 (1984): 84. But while Darsey avoids explicitly detailing the relationship between prophecy and the jeremiad, he does differentiate apocalyptic rhetoric from prophecy as two distinct rhetorical genres; see his *Prophetic Tradition*, 6-7, 114-16.
- 15. Ronald H. Carpenter, "The Historical Jeremiad as Rhetorical Genre," in *Form and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action*, ed. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (Palls Church, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1978), 104.

- 16. Vander Lei and Miller, "Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, 'I Have a Dream," 87.
- 17. Howard-Pitney, *Afro-American Jeremiad*, 13. John Murphy goes so far as to argue that "the jeremiad cannot serve as a vehicle for social criticism," though the African American separatist jeremiad that I describe below may temper this claim somewhat; see his "'A time of shame and sorrow': Robert F. Kennedy and the American Jeremiad," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 76 (1990): 404.
- 18. Howard-Pitney, Afro-American Jeremiad, 14.
- 19. "Few separationists have sought to establish communication with the white community; it is almost impossible, and probably useless." See J. L. Golden and R. D. Rieke, *The Rhetoric of Black Americans* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), 377.
- 20. W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Conservation of Races* (Washington, D.C.: American Negro Academy, 1897). Also available in *W. E. B. Du Bois Speaks: Speeches and Addresses, 1890-1919*, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1966), 73-85. For an insightful and often-cited analysis of this address, see: Anthony Appiah, "The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race," *Critical Inquiry* 12 (1985): 21-37.
- 21. B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "The Rhetorical Persona: Marcus Garvey as Black Moses," *Communication Monographs* 49 (1982): 56, 57. See also: Elwood Watson, "Marcus Garvey's Garveyism: Message from a Forefather," *Journal of Religious Thought* 51 (1995): 77-94. For a contemporary oppositional jeremiad, sec: Molefi K. Asante, *Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change* (Buffalo: Amulefi Publishing, 1980).
- 22. Generally, apocalyptic discourse is differentiated into "postmillennial" and "premillennial" varieties. Postmillennial apocalyptic discourse foretells a golden age to come *after* the millennium, which may be many years, or many centuries, in the future, and which may be avoided or hastened through human choice and action. The golden age foretold by premillennial apocalyptic speech, in contrast, is to occur *before* the millennium, which is imminent and cannot be altered. As both Brummett and Stephen D. O'Leary suggest, postmillennial apocalyptic rhetoric often is difficult to distinguish from the jeremiad; see Brummett, "Premillennial Apocalyptic," 84; O'Leary, "A Dramatistic Theory of Apocalyptic Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 79 (1993): 409. Throughout this essay, I will use "apocalyptic" to refer to premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric.
- 23. Brummett, "Premillennial Apocalyptic," 85.
- 24. Darsey, Prophetic Tradition, 117.
- 25. Brummett, "Premillennial Apocalyptic," 86.
- 26. O'Leary, "Dramatistic Theory," 388.
- 27. Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 76; Sterling Stuckey, The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); Wilson Jeremiah Moses, Classical Black Nationalism: From the American Revolution to Marcus Garvey (New York: New York University Press, 1996).

- 28. Brummett notes that "some scholars argue that apocalyptic provokes social action" while others "argue that apocalyptic encourages passive withdrawal from society" ("Premillennial Apocalyptic," 85).
- 29. David Walker, Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965), 11.
- 30. One of the messianic groups that seems to have contributed particularly strongly to the foundation of the Nation of Islam is the Moorish Science Temple of America, founded by the "prophet" Noble Drew Ali; see Arthur H. Fauset, "Moorish Science Temple of America," in *Religion, Society, and the Individual: An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion*, ed. John M. Yinger (New York: Macmillan, 1957). Clegg Andrew Clegg III provides an exceptionally thorough re-telling of the foundational mythology of the National of Islam; see his *An Original Man: The Life and Times of Elijah Muhammad* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 41-71.
- 31. C. Eric Lincoln, *The Black Muslims in America*, 3d ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 27-28.
- 32. Goldman, *Death and Life*, 79. Goldman also discusses some of the various strategies through which group loyalty and identification are reinforced, including injunctions against excessive contact with non-Muslim blacks and a concomitant proliferation of social, service, and educational programs that claim much of members' time (81-83).
- 33. Edwin S. Redkey points out, for example, that "Garvey's followers ... were the same Southern black marginal farmers who had responded to the emigration appeals of [black nationalist] Bishop Turner and his followers a generation earlier." Sec Black Exodus: *Black Nationalist and Back-to-Africa Movements*, 1890-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 294.
- 34. Lincoln describes the membership of the Nation of Islam at about the time Malcolm X delivered "Black Man's History"; see Lincoln, *Black Muslims*, 20-31. See also: John R Howard, "The Making of a Black Muslim," *Society* 35 (1998): 32-38. Originally published in 1966.
- 35. Malcolm X, "Black Man's History," in *The End of White World Supremacy: Four Speeches by Malcolm X*, ed. Benjamin Karim, (New York: Little, Brown, 1971), 26. In the interests of textual economy, I do not include a separate note each time I reference the printed text of this speech; instead, I cite all references in collective notes placed near the ends of the relevant paragraphs.
- 36. Malcolm X, "Black Man's History," 25.
- 37. Darsey, Prophetic Tradition, 18.
- 38. Brummett, "Premillennial Apocalyptic," 85; Darsey, Prophetic Tradition, 20, 203.
- 39. As I was making final revisions on this essay, I had the good fortune to discover the work of Louis A. DeCaro Jr., who notes the same peculiar "literalness" that characterizes NOI prophecy: "Far from a homiletic application, Muhammad actually maintained that his interpretations of the Bible were the original intent of the biblical writers, though these intentions were either hidden or destroyed by the 'fixing' of whites." DeCaro develops a argument that this literalness is symptomatic of a more general NOI dilemma regarding the appropriation of biblical texts. See *Malcolm and the Cross: The Nation of Islam, Malcolm X, and Christianity* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 48-49. Also of note

- is Sacvan Bercovitch's claim that "The American jeremiad was born in an effort to impose metaphor upon reality." The teachings of Elijah Muhammad, as an oppositional mirror, attempt to remove a patina of metaphor from the reality of "Yacub's History." See *The American Jeremiad* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 62.
- 40. As Malcolm X puts it: "Moses never went down into Egypt. Moses went into the caves of Europe and civilized the white man. It was Moses who raised the devil from a dead level to a perpendicular and placed him on the square" (Malcolm X, "Black Man's History," 64).
- 41. Malcolm X, "Black Man's History," 33, 34-35, 36, 37.
- 42. Darsey, *Prophetic Tradition*, 54-55.
- 43. Malcolm X, "Black Man's History," 36, 39, 40.
- 44. Elijah Muhammad, *Message to the Blackman in America* (Chicago: Muhammad's Temple No. 2, 1965), 110-22.
- 45. Malcolm X, "Black Man's History," 43, 44, 45, 51, 56-57.
- 46. "Elijah Muhammad's myth was ... a dissent that constructed great limitations for itself. Its authenticity came at the price of disengagement from this-worldly ways of thinking. It required a mythic consciousness that placed evidence and causality outside human time. It thereby removed the possibility for collective human action in the world." See Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites, "Malcolm X and the Limits of the Rhetoric of Revolutionary Dissent," *Journal of Black Studies* 23 (1993): 297.
- 47. A common criticism of the Nation of Islam, as voiced by Charles Kenyatta, a close associate of Malcolm X, was that they "clean people up, don't drink, don't smoke, but they don't do anything. Don't even vote" (Goldman, *Death and Life*, 93). And Malcolm himself noted, in his Autobiography, that "it could be heard increasingly in the Negro communities: 'Those Muslims talk tough, but they never do anything, unless somebody bothers Muslims'"; see Malcolm X and Alex Haley, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* (New York: Ballantine, 1965), 289. Far from fostering feelings of inferiority or impotence, the social separatism of the Nation of Islam offered a world "without white people and so without humiliation for fear" and introduced audiences to a body of esoteric knowledge that "invests them with a sense of personal and communal power" (Goldman, Death and Life, 80-81). Goldman's hypothesis is closely paraphrased in Sonsyrea Tate, *Little X: Growing Up in the Nation of Islam* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1997), 1-5.
- 48. Darsey, Prophetic Tradition, 16-17.
- 49. The story of the creation of the Nation of Islam is an oft-told tale. Sec: Peter Goldman, *Death and Life*, 35-41; Lincoln, *Black Muslims*, 11-20; Clegg, *Original Man*, 14-40.
- 50. Barbara Ann Norman, "The Black Muslims: A Rhetorical Analysis," (Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1985), 161. Illo describes Muhammad's discourse as "diffuse and halting, unornamented, solecistic, provincial, its development over-deliberate, its elocution low-keyed though rising to an affecting earnestness"; sec his "Rhetoric of Malcolm X," 6.

- 51. Darsey, Prophetic Tradition, 202.
- 52. Malcolm X, "Black Man's History," 25.
- 53. Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950; reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 45.
- 54. Malcolm X, "The Black Revolution," in *The End of White World Supremacy*, 72-73.
- 55. Goldman, Death and Life, 79.
- 56. Malcolm X, "A Declaration of Independence," in *Malcolm X Speaks*, ed. George Breitman, (New York: Pathfinder, 1965), 20-22. The factors that eventually propelled Malcolm X out of the Nation of Islam arc discussed by Goldman in *Death and Life*, 85-120; George Breitman, *The Last Year of Malcolm X: The Evolution of a Revolutionary* (New York: Pathfinder, 1967), 6-21; and in the *Autobiography*, 266-317.
- 57. Sec these articles in *Muhammad Speaks*, the official organ of the Nation of Islam: Elijah Muhammad, "Beware False Prophets" (July 31, 1964): I, 3, 8; Minister Lewis [sir], "Minister Who Knew Him Best-Part I: Rips Malcolm's Treachery, Defection" (May 8, I 964): 13; Minister Louis, "The Truth About: Fall of a Minister" (June 5, I 964): 8; Elijah Muhammad, "Victory of the Apostle: The Fate of Hypocrites" (January I 5, I 965): I, 3, 4.
- 58. Garth E. Pauley, "John Lewis's 'Serious Revolution': Rhetoric, Resistance, and Revision at the March on Washington," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84 (1998): 320-40.
- 59. Taylor Branch, *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years*, 1954-1963 (New York: Touchstone, 1988), 915-16. Malcolm's "Message to the Grass Roots" is in *Malcolm X Speaks*, 3-17.
- 60. Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality, 188-95.
- 61. Hariman and Beer, "What Would be Prudent," 303.
- 62. Robert Hariman, "Theory without Modernity." Hariman notes two strands of prudence, the rational calculation associated with Aristotle and the performative enactment of prudence associated with Cicero. A detailed discussion and comparison of these modes of prudence is beyond the scope of this essay, but my argument throughout is guided by my commitment to the Ciceronian proposition that prudence can best be studied through exemplars of public address. See also Hariman's essay "Prudence/Performance," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 21 (1991): 28.
- 63. Darsey, Prophetic Tradition, 23.
- 64. Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. L. H. G. Greenwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 1141b, 1140b.
- 65. Michael Leff, "The Habitation of Rhetoric," in *Argument and Critical Practices: Proceedings of the Fifth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation*, ed. Joseph W. Wenzel (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1987), 2.

- 66. Eugene Garver, Machiavelli and the History of Prudence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 50.
- 67. Hariman, "Prudence/Performance," 29.
- 68. This actually would be Malcolm's second visit to Mecca, because he had traveled there in 1959 in preparation for Elijah Muhammad's initial visit. He would return to the United States on May 21, 1964, but leave again on July 9 for an extended stay in Africa. He returned to the United States for the last time on November 24, about three months before his assassination on February 21, 1965.
- 69. Versions of this speech were delivered many times in front of a variety of audiences in the early spring of 1964. Like most of Malcolm X's speeches, it was delivered extemporaneously from only a few brief notes, so it is likely that the text varied considerably from one presentation to the next. I rely on the version that has been anthologized most often.
- 70. Robert E. Terrill, "Colonizing the Borderlands: Shifting Circumference in the Rhetoric of Malcolm X," *Quarterly journal of Speech* 86 (2000): 67-85.
- 71. Malcolm X, "The Ballot or the Bullet," in Malcolm X Speaks, 23-44. In the interests of textual economy, I do not include a separate note each time I reference the printed text of this speech; instead, I cite all references in collective notes placed near the ends of the relevant paragraphs.
- 72. James H. Cone, Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1991), 194.
- 73. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 24, 25.
- 74. My reading of the possibilities for unity in the rhetoric of Malcolm X also is at odds with Condit and Lucaites, who argue that "it was ... especially important during this phase of his dissent that [Malcolm X] stand for unity among Blacks"; see their "Limits of the Rhetoric of Revolutionary Dissent," 301. I am not denying that Malcolm X made repeated calls for unity throughout the last year of his life, but rather I am arguing that an audience constituted in and through his rhetoric would not be inclined toward this sort of unity.
- 75. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 26, 28.
- 76. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 26, 26-27.
- 77. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 28, 31, 31-32.
- 78. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 32, 33.
- 79. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 34.
- 80. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 34.
- 81. By making this distinction, Malcolm X is self-consciously challenging the Anglo-American tradition that aligns "human" and "civil" rights as near synonyms. As Shawna Maglangbayan suggests, the "difference that Malcolm X made between human rights and civil rights was not a play on words. Nor

was he launching a 'humanitarian' slogan. When he said that 'Civil rights is domestic. Human rights is international,' he was dearly rejecting the term 'civil rights' because of its exclusively *domestic* orientation. ... In Malcolm X's thinking 'human rights' and ultimate *independent Black nationhood* were one and the same thing." See *Garvey, Lumumba and Malcolm: National-separatists* (Chicago: Third World Press, 1972), 99-100.

- 82. W. E. B. Du Bois advocated a similar U.N. plan in 1946; see W E. B. Du Bois, "An Appeal to the World," in The Oxford WE. B. Du Bois Reader, ed. Eric). Sundquist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 454-61. Malcolm X makes this argument many times during his last year, and it is difficult to know to what extent he understood the limitations of this project. For example, Malcolm's dream in "The Ballot or the Bullet" that the "poor nations can get together with their voting power and keep the rich nations from making a move" (35-36) blinks the fact that such nations are too reliant on American aid to risk opposing the U.S. in the UN. Goldman suggests that Malcolm X "never quite abandoned the dream of a formal human rights case against the United States. But the people he had working on the petition never finished it only a rough outline ever got on paper and Malcolm had begun to despair of bringing it before the UN anyway. ... Privately, among the brothers, he admitted his discouragement conceded that the support wasn't there and wasn't likely to be as long as the Africans depended on American aid and American investments"; see Goldman, Death and Life, 241.
- 83. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 35.
- 84. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 36.
- 85. Levine, *Black Culture*, 114; John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Michelle Condit suggest that Malcolm X himself functions as a "trickster." See their "Reconstructing <Equality>: Culturetypal and Counter-Cultural Rhetorics in the Martyred Black Vision," *Communication Monographs* 57 (1990): 11. The similarities between the "trickster" figure of African American slave stories and the form of oppositional prudence that I am reading in Malcolm's rhetoric arc striking, and I am indebted to one of the anonymous R&PA reviewers for suggesting this connection.
- 86. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 36, 37.
- 87. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 38.
- 88. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 37.
- 89. Terrill, "Colonizing the Borderlands," 78.
- 90. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 38.
- 91. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 38-39, 40, 41. George Breitman suggests that this "analogy with Billy Graham was badly flawed." Breitman is correct, but not because Graham "was not trying to establish a church of his own, either on a city-wide or a nation-wide level"; see his *Last Year of Malcolm X*, 76. Rather, this analogy is flawed just as is Malcolm's opening analogy with other Christian ministers. A person who has been awakened in Christ might find relatively easy lodgment in any Christian church, but a person who has nurtured the untethered critical habits of mind that characterize Malcolm's version of black nationalism would be difficult to contain within any traditionally organized, hierarchical movement. Prudence privileges individual judgment and action, not group cohesion.

- 92. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 41, 42. This black nationalist convention was never held, partly because Malcolm X spent the majority of the rest of his life outside the country.
- 93. Malcolm X, "Ballot or the Bullet," 42, 43. Malcolm made his comments about "rifle dubs" in his "Declaration of Independence" from the Nation of Islam (Malcolm X Speaks, 18-22).
- 94. The NOI places of worship and instruction were called "temples" until about 1960, after Elijah Muhammad visited the Middle East; they then were renamed "mosques." Sec Louis A. DeCaro Jr., *On the Side of my People: A Religious Life of Malcolm X* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 23. Sec also Goldman, *Death and Life*, 60.
- 95. Cornel West notes that "The basic aim of black Muslim theology-with its distinct black supremacist account of the origins of white people-was to counter white supremacy. Yet this preoccupation with white supremacy still allowed white people to serve as the principal point of reference In short, Elijah Muhammad's project remained captive to the supremacy game"; see his *Race Matters* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 142. William W. Sales Jr., notes that "the Muslim ethic was very much that middle-class ethic of accommodation preached by Booker T. Washington, and in that sense it was essentially a program of Black economic nationalism"; see his *From Civil Rights to Black Liberation: Malcolm X and the Organization of Afro-American Unity* (Boston: South End Press, 1994), 65.
- 96. DcCaro, Malcolm and the Cross, 13.
- 97. Thomas Rosteck and Michael Leff, "Piety, Propriety, and Perspective: An Interpretation and Application of Key Terms in Kenneth Burke's Permanence and Change," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 53 (1989): 327-41.
- 98. Mark L. McPhail, "(Re)constructing the Color Line: Complicity and Black Conservatism," *Communication Theory* 7 (1997): 163.
- 99. McPhail, "(Re)constructing the Color Line," 164.
- 100. Mark L. McPhail, "Passionate Intensity: Louis Farrakhan and the Fallacies of Racial Reasoning," *Ouarterly Journal of Speech* 84 (1998): 417; West, *Race Matters*, 35-49.
- 101. Edmund David Cronon, *Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955), 188-90.
- 102. Marcus Garvey, *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey*, comp. Amy Jacques Garvey (Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1967), 71. The first two volumes of Garvey's Philosophy and Opinions are published together in one binding; quotation is from volume II). See also Manning Marable, *W. E. B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat* (Boston: Twayne, 1986), 118.
- 103. Malcolm X, "There's a Worldwide Revolution Going On," in *Malcolm X: The Last Speeches*, ed. Bruce Perry (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1989), 123.
- 104. After Malcolm X left the Nation of Islam, Elijah Muhammad selected Louis Farrakhan as Malcolm's successor. But after Elijah's death in 1975, his son, Wallace, took control of the Nation of Islam. When Wallace renamed the Nation and turned it toward orthodox Islam, Farrakhan left to rebuild the Nation of Islam and restore Elijah Muhammad's doctrines. Farced Z. Munir provides a very thorough

- history of the Nation of Islam in "Islam in America: An African American Pilgrimage Toward Coherence," (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1993), as does Martha F. Lee in *The Nation of Islam: An American Millenarian Movement* (Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, I 988). In the third edition of *The Black Muslims in America*, Lincoln provides a "Postscript" and "Epilogue" that provide a brief overview of the Nation of Islam after Malcolm.
- 105. McPhail, "Passionate Intensity," 417.
- 106. Manning Marable, "Black Fundamentalism: Farrakhan and Conservative Black Nationalism," *Race & Class* 39 (1998): 1-22.
- 107. Jim A. Kuypers, "Doxa and a Critical Rhetoric: Accounting for the Rhetorical Agent through Prudence," *Communication Quarterly* 44 (1996): 456.
- 108. Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," *Central States Speech Journal* 18 (1967): 13, 17; Hariman, "Terrible Beauty and Mundane Detail: Aesthetic Knowledge in the Practice of Everyday Life," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 35 (1998): 10-18.
- 109. Michael Leff, "Cicero's Pro Murena and the Strong Case for Rhetoric," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* I (1998): 63. For further discussion of the "weak" and "strong" cases for rhetoric, see Richard Lanham, *The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 155-56.
- 110. Lanham describes this managed tension as sprezzatura, the rapid oscillation of the "toggle switch" of decorum which is set into motion through the interaction between speaker and audience. See his *Electronic Word*, 188.
- 111. Victoria Kahn, *Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 39.
- 112. Leff, "Habitation of Rhetoric," 2, 7.
- 113. Wilson Jeremiah Moses, *Black Messiahs and Uncle Toms: Social and Literary Manipulations of a Religious Myth* (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982), 15.
- 114. Vander Lei and Miller, "Martin Luther King," 96.
- 115. Howard-Pitney, Afro-American Jeremiad, 170, 182, 183.
- 116. Hariman, "History of Prudence," (forthcoming).
- 117. Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (1941; reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 293-304.